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Abstract
In cooperative game theory, games in partition function form are real-valued
function on the set of so-called embedded coalitions, that is, pairs (S, pi) where S is
a subset (coalition) of the set N of players, and pi is a partition of N containing S.
Despite the fact that many studies have been devoted to such games, surprisingly
nobody clearly defined a structure (i.e., an order) on embedded coalitions, resulting
in scattered and divergent works, lacking unification and proper analysis. The aim
of the paper is to fill this gap, thus to study the structure of embedded coalitions
(called here embedded subsets), and the properties of games in partition function
form.
Keywords: partition, embedded subset, game, valuation, k-monotonicity
1 Introduction
The Boolean lattice of subsets and the lattice of partitions are two well-known posets,
with numerous applications in decision, game theory, classification, etc.
We consider in this paper a more complex structure, which is in some sense a combi-
nation of the above two. Its origin comes from cooperative game theory. Let us consider
a set N of n players, and define a real-valued function v on 2N , such that v(∅) = 0. Such
a function is called a game on N , and for any coalition (subset) S ⊆ N , the quantity
v(S) represents the “worth” or “power” of coalition S. Hence a game is a function on
the Boolean lattice 2N vanishing at the bottom element. Having a closer look at the
meaning of v(S), we could say more precisely: suppose that players in S form a coalition,
the other players in N \ S forming the “opponent” group. Then v(S) is the amount of
money earned by S (or the power of S) in such a dichotomic situation.
A more realistic view would be to consider that the opponent group may also be
divided into groups, say S2, . . . , Sk, so that {S2, . . . , Sk} form a partition of N \ S. In
this case it is likely that the value earned by S may depend on the partition of N \ S.
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Hence we are lead to define the quantity v(S, pi), where pi is a partition of N containing
S as a block, i.e., pi = {S, S2, . . . , Sk}.
Such games are called games in partition function form, while (S, pi) is called an
embedded coalition, and have been introduced by Thrall and Lucas [21]. Despite the fact
that many works have been undertaken on this topic (let us cite, among others, Myerson
[17], Bolger [6], Do and Norde [9], Fujinaka [10], Clippel and Serrano [8], Albizuri et al.
[2], Macho-Stadler et al. [16], who all propose various definitions and axiomatizations of
the Shapley value, and Funaki and Yamato [11] who deal with the core, etc.), surprisingly
nobody has clearly defined a structure for embedded coalitions. As a consequence, most
of these works have divergent point of views, lack unification, and do not provide a good
mathematical analysis of the concept of game in partition function form. This paper tends
to fill this gap. We propose a natural structure for embedded coalitions (which we call
embedded subsets), which is a lattice, study it, and provide a variety of results described
below. Our analysis will consider in particular the following points, all motivated by
game theory but also commonly considered in the field of posets:
(i) The number of maximal chains between two given embedded subsets. Many con-
cepts in game theory are defined through maximal chains, like the Shapley value
[19] and the core of convex games [20]. This is addressed in Section 3, where a
thorough analysis of the poset of embedded subsets is done. Based on these results,
Grabisch and Funaki propose in [14] a definition of the Shapley value, different from
the ones cited above, and having good properties.
(ii) The Mo¨bius function on the lattice of embedded subsets. Usually the function
obtained by the Mo¨bius inversion on a game is called the Mo¨bius transform of this
game, or the dividends. It is a fundamental notion, permitting to express a game
in the basis of unanimity games. This topic is addressed in Section 5, and is a new
achievement in the theory of games in partition function form.
(iii) Particular classes of games, like additive games, super- and submodular games
(Section 4), ∞-monotone games, also called, up to some differences, positive games
or belief functions, and minitive games (Section 6). Additive games, corresponding
to valuations on lattices, are basic in game theory since they permit to define the
core and all procedures of sharing. Super- and submodular functions are also very
common in game theory and combinatorial optimization. ∞-monotone games are
especially important because in the classical Boolean case they have nonnegative
dividends (Mo¨bius transform), and they are well-known in artificial intelligence and
decision theory under the name of belief functions. Lastly, minitive games, also
called necessity functions in artificial intelligence, are particular belief functions. In
poset language, they are inf-preserving mappings. Our analysis brings many new
results, establishing the existence of these particular classes of games.
2 Background on partitions
In this section, we introduce our notation and recall useful results on the geometric lattice
of partitions (see essentially Aigner [1], and [12]), and prove some results needed in the
following.
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We consider the set [n] =: N , and denote its subsets by S, T, S ′, T ′, . . . , and by
s, t, s′, t′, . . . their respective cardinalities. The set of partitions of [n] is denoted by Π(n).
Partitions are denoted by pi, pi′, . . ., and pi = {S1, . . . , Sk}, S1, . . . , Sk ∈ 2
N . Subsets
S1, . . . , Sk are called blocks of pi. A partition into k blocks is a k-partition.
Taking pi, pi′ partitions in Π(n), we say that pi is a refinement of pi′ (or pi′ is a coarsening
of pi), denoted by pi ≤ pi′, if any block of pi is contained in a block of pi′ (or every block
of pi′ fully decomposes into blocks of pi). When endowed with the refinement relation,
(Π(n),≤) is a lattice, called the partition lattice.
We use the following shorthands: pi⊤ := {N}, pi⊥ := {{1}, . . . , {n}}. For any ∅ 6=
S ⊂ N , pi⊤S := {S,N \S}, pi
⊥
S := {S, {i1}, . . . , {in−s}}, with N \S =: {i1, . . . , in−s}. Also,
for any two partitions pi, pi′ such that pi ≤ pi′, the notation [pi, pi′] means as usual the set
of all partitions pi′′ such that pi ≤ pi′′ ≤ pi′.
The following facts on Π(n) will be useful in the following:
(i) The number of partitions of k blocks is Sn,k (Stirling number of the second kind),
with
Sn,k :=
1
k!
n∑
i=0
(−1)k−i
(
k
i
)
in, n ≥ 0, k ≤ n.
(ii) Each partition pi covers
∑
S∈pi 2
|S|−1−|pi| partitions. Each k-partition is covered by(
k
2
)
partitions.
(iii) Let pi := {S1, . . . , Sk} be a k-partition. Then we have the following isomorphisms:
[pi, pi⊤] ∼= Π(k)
[pi⊥, pi] ∼=
k∏
i=1
Π(si)
[pi, pi′] ∼=
|pi′|∏
i=1
Π(mi) for some mi’s with
|pi′|∑
i=1
mi = k.
We give the following results (up to our knowledge, some of them have not yet been
investigated), which will be used in the following. We use the notation C(P ) to denote
the set of maximal chains from bottom to top in the poset P , whenever this makes sense.
Proposition 1. Let pi, pi′ ∈ Π(n) such that pi′ < pi, with pi := {S1, . . . , Sk} and pi
′ :=
{S11, . . . , S1l1 , S21, . . . , S2l2 , . . . , Sklk}, with {Si1, . . . , Sili} a partition of Si, i = 1, . . . , k,
and k′ :=
∑k
i=1 li.
(i) The number of maximal chains of Π(n) from bottom to top is
|C(Π(n))| =
n!(n− 1)!
2n−1
.
(ii) The number of maximal chains from pi⊥ to pi is
|C([pi⊥, pi])| =
(n− k)!
2n−k
s1!s2! · · · sk!.
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(iii) The number of maximal chains from pi to pi⊤ is
|C([pi, pi⊤])| = |C(Π(k))|.
(iv) The number of maximal chains from pi′ to pi is
|C([pi′, pi])| =
(k′ − k)!
2k′−k
l1!l2! · · · lk!
Proof. (i) See Barbut and Monjardet [3, p. 103].
(ii) We use the fact that for any k-partition pi = {S1, . . . , Sk}, [pi
⊥, pi] =
∏k
i=1Π(si). We
have the general following fact: if L = L1 × · · · × Lk, then to obtain all maximal
chains in L, we select a k-uple of maximal chains C1, . . . , Ck in L1, . . . , Lk respec-
tively, say of length c1, . . . , ck. Then the number of chains induced by C1, . . . , Ck in
L is equal to the number of chains in the lattice C1 × · · · × Ck, isomorphic to the
lattice c1 × · · · × ck (ci denotes the linear lattice of ci elements). This is known to
be
(
∑k
i=1 ci)!∏k
i=1(ci!)
.
Applied to our case, this gives
|C([pi⊥, pi])| =
k∏
i=1
|C(Π(si)|
(∑k
i=1(si − 1)
)
!∏k
i=1(si − 1)!
which after simplification gives the desired result, using the fact that
∑k
i=1(si−1) =
n− k.
(iii) Immediate from [pi, pi⊤] ∼= Π(k).
(iv) Simply consider S11, . . . , S1l1 , S21, . . . , S2l2 , . . . , Sklk , and use (ii) for Π(k
′).
3 The structure of embedded subsets
An embedded subset is a pair (S, pi) where S ∈ 2N \ {∅} and pi ∋ S, where pi ∈ Π(n).
We denote by C(N) (or by C(n)) the set of embedded coalitions on N . For the sake of
concision, we often denote by Spi the embedded coalition (S, pi), and omit braces and
commas for subsets (example with n = 3: 12{12, 3} instead of ({1, 2}, {{1, 2}, {3}})).
Remark that C(N) is a proper subset of 2N ×Π(N).
As mentionned in the introduction, works on games in partition function form do
not explicitly define a structure (that is, some order) on embedded coalitions. A natural
choice is to take the product order on 2N ×Π(N):
(S, pi) ⊑ (S ′, pi′)⇔ S ⊆ S ′ and pi ≤ pi′.
Evidently, the top element of this ordered set is (N, pi⊤) (denoted more simply by N{N}
according to our conventions). However, due to the fact that the empty set is not allowed
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in (S, pi), there is no bottom element in the poset (C(N),⊑), since all elements of the
form ({i}, pi⊥) are minimal elements. For mathematical convenience, we introduce an
artificial bottom element ⊥ to C(N) (it could be considered as (∅, pi⊥)), and denote
C(N)⊥ := C(N)∪ {⊥}. We give as illustration the partially ordered set (C(N)⊥,⊑) with
n = 3 (Fig. 1).
⊥
1{1, 2, 3} 2{1, 2, 3} 3{1, 2, 3}
12{12, 3} 3{12, 3} 1{1, 23} 23{1, 23} 13{13, 2} 2{13, 2}
123{123}
Figure 1: Hasse diagram of (C(N)⊥,⊑) with n = 3. Elements with the same partition
are framed in grey.
As the next proposition will show, (C(n)⊥,⊑) is a lattice, whose main properties are
given below. We investigate in particular the number of maximal chains between two
elements of this lattice. The reason is that, in game theory, many notions are defined
through maximal chains (e.g., the Shapley value, the core, etc.). The cases n = 1, 2 are
discarded since trivial (C(2)⊥ = 2
2). The standard terminology used hereafter can be
found in any textbook on lattices and posets (e.g., [1, 7, 15]).
Proposition 2. For any n > 2, (C(n)⊥,⊑) is a lattice, with the following properties:
(i) Supremum and infimum are given by
(S, pi) ∨ (S ′, pi′) = (T ∪ T ′, ρ)
(S, pi) ∧ (S ′, pi′) = (S ∩ S ′, pi ∧ pi′) if S ∩ S ′ 6= ∅, and ⊥ otherwise,
where T, T ′ are blocks of pi ∨ pi′ containing respectively S and S ′, and ρ is the
partition obtained by merging T and T ′ in pi ∨ pi′.
(ii) Top and bottom elements are N{N} and ⊥. Every element is complemented; for a
given Spi, any embedded subset of the form SpiS with S the complement of S and
piS any partition containing S, is a complement of Spi.
(iii) Each element Spi where pi := {S, S2, . . . , Sk} is a k-partition is covered by
(
k
2
)
elements, and covers
∑
T∈pi 2
t−1 − |pi|+ 2s−1 − 1 elements.
(iv) Its join-irreducible elements are (i, pi⊥), i ∈ N (atoms), and (i, pi⊥jk), i, j, k ∈ N ,
i 6∈ {j, k}. Its meet-irreducible elements are (S, pi) where pi is any 2-partition (co-
atoms).
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(v) The lattice satisfies the Jordan-Dedekind chain condition (otherwise said, the lattice
is ranked), and its height function is h(S, pi) = n− k + 1, if pi is a k-partition. The
height of the lattice is n.
(vi) The lattice is not distributive (and even neither upper nor lower locally distributive),
not atomistic (hence not geometric), not modular but upper semimodular.
(vii) The number of elements on level of height k is kSn,k. The total number of elements
is
∑n
k=1 kSn,k + 1.
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
|C(n)⊥| 2 4 11 38 152 675 3264 17008
(viii) Let Spi := S{S, S2, . . . , Sk} and S
′pi′ := S ′{S ′, S12, . . . , S1l1 , S21, . . . , S2l2 , . . . , Sk1, . . . , Sklk},
and k′ :=
∑k
i=1 li. We have the following isomorphisms:
[(i, pi⊥), N{N}] ∼= Π(n)
[⊥, Spi] ∼=
(
C(S)× Π(S2)× · · · × Π(Sk)
)
∪ {⊥}
[Spi,N{N}] ∼= [i{i, i2, . . . , ik}, K{K}] ∼= Π(k)
[S ′pi′, Spi] ∼= [ipi⊥, Spi]C(k′)⊥ ,
where the subscript C(k′)⊥ means that elements in the brackets are understood to
belong to C(k′)⊥.
(ix) The number of maximal chains from ⊥ to N{N} is (n!)
2
2n−1
, which is also the number
of maximal longest chains in C(n).
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
|C(C(n)⊥)| 1 2 9 72 900 16 200 396 900 12 700 800
(x) Let Spi be an embedded subset, with pi := {S, S2 . . . , Sk}, and |S| = s. The number
of maximal chains from ⊥ to Spi is
|C([⊥, Spi])| =
s(n− k)!
2n−k
s!s2! · · · sk!.
The number of maximal chains from (S, pi) to N{N} is
|C([(S, pi), N{N}])| =
1
k
|C(C(k)⊥)| =
k!(k − 1)!
2k−1
.
(xi) Let S ′pi′ < Spi with the above notation. The number of maximal chains from S ′pi′
to Spi is
|C([S ′pi′, Spi])| =
l1(k
′ − k)
2k′−k
l1!l2! . . . lk!
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Proof. Consider (S, pi), (S ′, pi′) ∈ C(n)⊥. Then (K, ρ) is an upper bound of both elements
iff K ⊇ S ∪ S ′ and ρ ≥ pi ∨ pi′ (clearly exists). If S ∪ S ′ ∈ pi ∨ pi′ then (S ∪ S ′, pi ∨ pi′)
is the least upper bound. If not, since S ∈ pi and S ′ ∈ pi′ and by definition of pi ∨ pi′,
there exist blocks T, T ′ of pi ∨ pi′ such that T ⊇ S and T ′ ⊇ S ′. Then (T ∪ T ′, ρ), where
ρ is the partition obtained by merging T and T ′ in pi ∨ pi′, is the least upper bound of
(S, pi), (S ′, pi′).
Next, (S ∩S ′, pi∧pi′) would be the infimum if S ∩S ′ is a block of pi∧pi′. If S ∩S ′ 6= ∅,
then this is the case. If not, then ⊥ is the only lower bound. This proves that (C(n)⊥,≤)
is a lattice, and (i), (ii) hold (the assertion on complemented elements is clear).
(iii) Clear from (ii) in Section 2.
(iv) Clear from (iii).
(v) From (iii), Spi covers S ′pi′ implies that if pi is a k-partition, then pi′ is a (k + 1)-
partition. Hence, a maximal chain from Spi to the bottom element has length n− k + 1,
which proves the Jordan-Dedekind chain condition. Now, the height function is h(Spi) =
n− k + 1.
(vi) The lattice is not (upper or lower locally) distributive since it contains diamonds.
For example, with n = 3, the following 5 elements form a diamond (see Fig. 1):
(1, {1, 2, 3}), (12, {12, 3}), (1, {1, 23}), (13, {13, 2}), (123, {123}).
For atomisticity see (iv). Let us prove it is upper semimodular. Since the lattice is
ranked, if x covers x ∧ y and x ∧ y, then both x and y are one level above x ∧ y. Hence
using (iii), if x∧ y := (S, {S, S2, . . . , Sk}), then x has either the form (S, {S, Si ∪Sj , . . .})
or (S ∪ Si, {S ∪ Si, . . .}), and similarly y = (S, {S, Sk ∪ Sl, . . .}) or (S ∪ Sj, {S ∪ Sj , . . .}).
To compute x ∨ y, we have three cases:
• x = (S, {S, Si ∪ Sj , . . .}) and y = (S, {S, Sk ∪ Sl, . . .}): then x ∨ y = (S, {S, Si ∪
Sj, Sk ∪ Sl, . . .}) if k, l 6= i, j. If, e.g., k = i, x ∨ y = (S, {S, Si ∪ Sj ∪ Sl, . . .}).
• x = (S ∪ Si, {S ∪ Si, . . .}) and y = (S ∪ Sj , {S ∪ Sj , . . .}): then x ∨ y = (S ∪ Si ∪
Sj, {S ∪ Si ∪ Sj , . . .}).
• x = (S, {S, Si ∪Sj, . . .}) and y = (S ∪ Sk, {S ∪Sk, . . .}): then x∨ y = (S ∪Sk, {S ∪
Sk, Si ∪ Sj , . . .}) if k 6= i, j. If k = i, x ∨ y = (S ∪ Si ∪ Sj, {S ∪ Si ∪ Sj , . . .}).
In all cases, we get a (k−2)-partition, so upper modularity holds. Lower semimodularity
does not hold. Taking the example of C(3)⊥, 123{123} covers 12{12, 3} and 3{3, 12}, but
these elements do not cover 12{12, 3} ∧ 3{12, 3} = ⊥.
(vii) Clear from the results on Π(n).
(viii) Consider the element (i, pi⊥) in C(n)⊥, i ∈ N . Then [(i, pi
⊥), N{N}] is a sub-
lattice isomorphic to Π(n), since by (iii) the number of elements covering (i, pi⊥) is the
same as the number of elements covering pi⊥ in Π(n), and that this property remain true
for all elements above (i, pi⊥).
The other assertions are clear.
(ix) Since by Prop. 1, C(Π(n)) = n((n−1)!)
2
2n−1
, and using (viii) and the fact that there
are n mutually incomparable elements (i, pi⊥) in C(n)⊥, the result follows.
(x) The proof follows the same technique as for Prop. 1 (ii). Using the second assertion
of (viii) and noting that deleting the bottom element does not change the number of
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maximal (longest) chains, we can write immediately
|C([⊥, Spi])| =
k∏
i=1
|C(Π(si))||C(C(s))|
(∑k
i=1 si − 1
)
!∏k
i=1(si − 1)!
.
The result follows by using Prop. 1 (i) and (ix).
The second assertion is clear since [Spi,N{N}] is isomorphic to Π(k) by (viii).
(xi) Same as for Proposition 1 (iv).
4 Functions on C(n)⊥
We investigate properties of some classes of real-valued functions over C(n)⊥. As our
motivation comes from game theory, we will focus on games, that is, functions vanishing
at the bottom element, and on valuations, which are related to additive games, another
fundamental notion in game theory.
Definition 1. A game in partition function form on N (called here for short simply
game on C(N)⊥) is a mapping v : C(N)⊥ → R, such that v(⊥) = 0. The set of all games
in partition function form on N is denoted by PG(N).
Definition 2. Let v ∈ PG(N).
(i) v is monotone if Spi ⊑ S ′pi′ implies v(Spi) ≤ v(S ′pi′). A monotone game on C(N)⊥ is
called a capacity on C(N)⊥. A capacity on C(N)⊥ v is normalized if v(N{N}) = 1.
(ii) v is supermodular if for every Spi, S ′pi′ we have
v(Spi ∨ S ′pi′) + v(Spi ∧ S ′pi′) ≥ v(Spi) + v(S ′pi′).
It is submodular if the reverse inequality holds.
(iii) A game is additive if it is both supermodular and submodular.
(iv) More generally, for a given k ≥ 2, a game is k-monotone if for all families of k
elements S1pi1, . . . , Skpik (not necessarily different), we have
v
( ∨
i∈K
Sipii
)
≥
∑
J⊆K,J 6=∅
(−1)|J+1|v
(∧
i∈J
Sipii
)
putting K := {1, . . . , k}. A game is ∞-monotone if it is k-monotone for every
k ≥ 2. Note that k-monotonicity implies k′-monotonicity for any 2 ≤ k′ ≤ k.
(v) A game is a belief function if it is a normalized ∞-monotone capacity.
The following result is due to Barthe´lemy [4].
Proposition 3. Let L be a lattice. Then f is monotone and ∞-monotone on L if and
only if it is monotone and (|L| − 2)-monotone.
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In lattice theory, a valuation (or 2-valuation) on a lattice L is a real-valued function
on L being both super- and submodular (i.e., it is additive in our terminology). More
generally, for a given k ≥ 2, a k-valuation satisfies
v
( ∨
i∈K
xi
)
=
∑
J⊆K,J 6=∅
(−1)|J+1|v
(∧
i∈J
xi
)
for every family of k elements. An ∞-valuation is a function f which is a k-valuation for
every k ≥ 2. The following well-known results clarify the existence of valuations (see [5,
Ch. X], and also [4]).
Proposition 4. Let L be a lattice.
(i) L is modular if and only if it admits a strictly monotone valuation.
(ii) L is distributive if and only if it admits a strictly monotone 3-valuation.
(iii) L is distributive if and only if it is modular and every strictly monotone valuation
is a k-valuation for any k ≥ 2.
(iv) Any lattice admits an ∞-valuation.
The consequence of (i) is that no strictly monotone additive game exists since C(n)⊥
is not modular when n > 2. The question is: does it exist an additive game? We shall
prove that the answer is no (except for the trivial game v = 0) as soon as n > 2.
Proposition 5. C(2)⊥ admits a strictly monotone 2-valuation (hence by Prop. 3, a
strictly monotone ∞-monotone valuation). If n > 2, the only possible valuations on
C(n)⊥ are constant valuations.
Proof. For n = 2, the result is clear from Proposition 4 since C(2)⊥ = 2
2. For n > 2, we
shall proceed by induction on n. Let us show the result for n = 3. Let f : C(3)⊥ → R.
To check whether f is a valuation amounts to verify that
f(x) + f(y) = f(x ∨ y) + f(x ∧ y), ∀x, y ∈ C(3), x and y not comparable.
This leads to a linear system, for which the constant function is an obvious solution. Let
us show that it is the only one. We extract the following subsystem, naming for brevity
elements Spi by a, b, c, . . . as on Figure 2:
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⊥g h i
a b c d e f
⊤
Figure 2: Hasse diagram of (C(3)⊥,⊑)
f(a) + f(b) = f(⊤) + f(⊥) (1)
f(a) + f(c) = f(⊤) + f(g) (2)
f(a) + f(e) = f(⊤) + f(g) (3)
f(a) + f(i) = f(⊤) + f(⊥) (4)
f(b) + f(c) = f(⊤) + f(⊥) (5)
f(b) + f(f) = f(⊤) + f(⊥) (6)
f(b) + f(g) = f(⊤) + f(⊥) (7)
f(b) + f(h) = f(⊤) + f(⊥) (8)
f(c) + f(d) = f(⊤) + f(⊥) (9)
f(c) + f(f) = f(⊤) + f(⊥) (10)
f(c) + f(h) = f(⊤) + f(⊥) (11)
f(f) + f(g) = f(⊤) + f(⊥) (12)
f(f) + f(i) = f(⊤) + f(⊥) (13)
f(b) = f(i) from (1) and (4), f(c) = f(f) = f(g) = f(h) from (5), (6), (7) and (8),
f(d) = f(f) = f(h) from (9), (10) and (11), f(g) = f(i) from (12) and (13). Then
f(g) = f(⊥) from (1) and (2), and hence f(a) = f(⊤) from (1), and f(e) = f(g) from
(3). Finally f(⊤) = f(⊥) from (5). This proves the assertion for n = 3.
Assume the assertion holds till n, and let us prove it for n + 1. The idea is to cover
entirely C(n+1)⊥ by overlapping copies of C(n)⊥. Then since on each copy the valuation
has to be constant by assumption, it will be constant everywhere. Let us consider the
set C[ij] of those embedded subsets in C(n + 1)⊥ where elements i, j ∈ N belong to the
same block (i.e., as if [ij] were a single element). Then this set plus the bottom element
⊥ of C(n + 1)⊥, which we denote by C[ij]⊥, is isomorphic to C(n)⊥. Moreover, C[ij]⊥ is
a sublattice of C(n + 1)⊥, since the supremum and infimum in C(n + 1)⊥ of embedded
subsets in C[ij]⊥ remains in C[ij]⊥ (because [ij] is never splitted when taking the infimum
and supremum over partitions). This proves that the system for equations of valuation
in C[ij]⊥ is the same than the set of equations in C(n + 1)⊥ restricted to C[ij]⊥. Taking
all possibilities for i, j cover all elements of C(n + 1)⊥, except atoms. Also, since ⊤ and
⊥ belongs to each C[ij]⊥, an overlap exists. It remains to cover the set of atoms. For
this we consider C(n)⊥, and to each embedded subset Spi we add the block {n+ 1} in pi.
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Again, this is a sublattice of C(n + 1)⊥ isomorphic to C(n)⊥, covering all atoms except
{n + 1}pi⊥. For this last one, it suffices to do the same on the set {2, . . . , n + 1} and to
add the block {1} to each partition.
Since any game v satisfies v(⊥) = 0, we have:
Corollary 1. The only additive game is the constant game v = 0.
We comment on this surprising result. Our definition of an additive game follows tra-
dition in the theory of posets: additivity means both supermodularity and submodularity,
and as a consequence, it converts supremum (similar as union) into addition, provided
the elements do not cover a common element different from the bottom element (similar
to elements with an empty intersection). But it does not match with the traditional view
in game theory, where additive games are assimilated to imputations, hence to values. An
imputation is a vector defined on the set of players, often indicating how the total worth
of the game is shared among players. Incidentally, in the classical setting, both notions
coincide. In this more complex structure, this is no more the case. The nonexistence of
additive games does not imply therefore the absence of imputation or value. It simply
says that it is not possible to have an additivity property (converting supremum into a
sum) for such a game. The consequence is that games in partition function form cannot
be written in a simpler form, like an additive game which is equivalent to a n-dimensional
vector in the classical setting.
5 The Mo¨bius function on C(n)⊥
The Mo¨bius function is a central notion in combinatorics and posets (see [18]). It is also
very useful in cooperative game theory, since it leads to the Mo¨bius transform (known in
this domain as the Harsanyi dividends of a game), which are the coordinates of a game
in the basis of unanimity games (see end of this section).
First we give the results for the lattice of partitions Π(n).
Proposition 6. Let pi, σ be partitions in Π(n) such that pi < σ. Let us denote by b(pi)
the number of blocks of pi, with n1, . . . , nb(pi) the sizes of the blocks. Then the Mo¨bius
function on Π(n) is given by:
(i) µΠ(n)(pi
⊥, {N}) = (−1)n−1(n− 1)!
(ii) µΠ(n)(pi, {N}) = (−1)
b(pi)−1(b(pi)− 1)!
(iii) µΠ(n)(pi
⊥, pi) = (−1)n−b(pi)(n1 − 1)! · · · (nb(pi)−1)!
(iv) µΠ(n)(pi, σ) = (−1)
b(pi)−b(σ)(m1−1)! · · · (mb(σ)−1)!, with m1, . . . , mb(pi) integers such
that
∑b(σ)
i=1 mi = b(pi).
Proof. (i) is proved in Aigner [1, p. 154]. The rest is deduced from the isomorphisms
given in Section 2.
We recall also the following fundamental result [12].
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Proposition 7. If P is a lattice with bottom element 0 and set of atoms A, for every
x ∈ P , the Mo¨bius function reads
µ(0, x) =
∑
S⊆A|
∨
S=x
(−1)|S|.
In C(N)⊥, there are only a few elements representable by atoms. These are Spi
⊥
S ,
where pi⊥S is the partition formed by S and singletons. The unique way to write Spi
⊥
S is∨
i∈S(ipi
⊥). Hence, the Mo¨bius function over C(N)⊥, denoted simply by µ if no confusion
occurs, otherwise by µC(N)⊥ , is known for (⊥, Spi):
µ(⊥, Spi) =
{
(−1)|S|, if pi = pi⊥S
0, otherwise.
(1)
Let us find µ(Spi,N{N}). Since [S{S, S2, . . . , Sk}, N{N}] ∼= [i{i, i2, . . . , ik}, K{K}]
(see Proposition 2 (viii)), we have µC(n)⊥(S{S, S2, . . . , Sk}, N{N}) = µC(k)⊥(ipi
⊥, K{K}).
We know also that [ipi⊥, N{N}] ∼= Π(N), from which we deduce by Proposition 6 that
µ(ipi⊥, N{N}) = µΠ(n)(pi
⊥, {N}) = (−1)n−1(n− 1)!. Hence
µ(S{S, S2, . . . , Sk}, N{N}) = (−1)
k−1(k − 1)!. (2)
It remains to compute the general expression for (S ′pi′, Spi). We put Spi := S{S, S2, . . . , Sk}
and S ′pi′ := S ′{S ′, S12, . . . , S1l1, S21, . . . , S2l2, . . . , Sk1, . . . , Sklk}, and k
′ :=
∑k
i=1 li. Then
[S ′pi′, Spi] ∼= [ipi⊥, Spi]C(k′)⊥, where the subscript C(k
′)⊥ means that elements in the brack-
ets are understood to belong to C(k′)⊥. Hence we deduce:
µ(S ′pi′, Spi) = µΠ(k′)(pi
⊥, pi) = (−1)k
′−k(l1 − 1)! · · · (lk − 1)!.
In summary, we have proved:
Proposition 8. The Mo¨bius function on C(n)⊥ is given by (with the above notation):
µ(⊥, Spi) =
{
(−1)|S|, if pi = pi⊥S
0, otherwise.
(3)
µ(S ′pi′, Spi) = (−1)k
′−k(l1 − 1)! · · · (lk − 1)!, for S
′pi′ ⊑ Spi. (4)
In particular, µ(ipi⊥, Spi) = (−1)n−k(s− 1)!(s2 − 1)! · · · (sk − 1)!.
Using this, the Mo¨bius transform of any game v on C(N)⊥ is defined by
m(Spi) =
∑
S′pi′⊑Spi
µ(S ′pi′, Spi)v(S ′pi′), ∀Spi ∈ C(N)⊥.
Now, m gives the coordinates of v in the basis of unanimity games defined by:
uSpi(S
′pi′) =
{
1, if S ′pi′ ⊒ Spi
0, otherwise.
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Example 1. Application for n = 3. Let us compute the Mo¨bius transform of a game v.
We have, for all distinct i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
m(⊥) = 0
m(ipi⊥) = v(ipi⊥)
m(ij{ij, k}) = v(ij{ij, k})− v(ipi⊥)− v(jpi⊥)
m(i{i, jk}) = v(i{i, jk})− v(ipi⊥)
m(123{123}) = v(123{123})−
∑
i,j
v(ij{ij, k})−
∑
i
v(i{i, jk}) + 2
∑
i
v(ipi⊥).
Consider now the following game: v(123{123}) = 3, v(12{12, 3}) = 2, v(3{12, 3}) = 0,
v(1{1, 23}) = 1, v(23{1, 23}) = 2, v(13{13, 2}) = 1, v(2{13, 2}) = 1, v(2{13, 2}) = 1,
v(1{1, 2, 3}) = 1, v(2{1, 2, 3}) = 1, and v(3{1, 2, 3}) = 0. Let us find its coordinates in
the basis of unanimity games. It suffices to compute m(Spi) for all Spi ∈ C(3) from the
above formulas. We obtain:
m(1{1, 2, 3}) = m(2{1, 2, 3}) = m(23{1, 23}) = 1
and m(Spi) = 0 otherwise. Therefore,
v = u1{1,2,3} + u2{1,2,3} + u23{1,23}.
This decomposition can be checked on the figure of C(3) (Figure 1).
6 Belief functions and minitive functions on C(n)⊥
Belief functions and minitive functions (i.e., inf-preserving mappings, also called neces-
sity measures) are well-known in artificial intelligence and decision making, where the
underlying lattice is the Boolean lattice. In the case of an arbitrary lattice, they have
interesting properties, investigated by Barthlemy [4] and the author [13].
Barthe´lemy proved the following.
Proposition 9. Let L be any lattice, and f : L → R. If the Mo¨bius transform of
f , denoted by m, satisfies m(⊥) = 0, m(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ L, and
∑
x∈Lm(x) = 1
(normalization), then f is a belief function.
The converse of this proposition does not hold in general (it holds for the Boolean
lattice 2N ). A belief function is invertible if its Mo¨bius transform is nonnegative, normal-
ized and vanishes at ⊥. The following counterexample shows that for C(n)⊥, there exist
belief functions which are not invertible.
Example 2. Let us take C(3)⊥, and consider a function f whose values are given on
the figure below. Monotonicity implies that 1 ≥ β ≥ α ≥ 0. In order to check ∞-
monotonicity, from Proposition 3 we know that it suffices to check till 7-monotonicity. We
write below the most constraining inequalities only, keeping in mind that 1 ≥ β ≥ α ≥ 0.
2-monotonicity is equivalent to β ≥ 2α and 1 ≥ 2β − α. 3-monotonicity is equivalent
to 1 ≥ 3β−α. 4-monotonicity is equivalent to 1 ≥ 4β−3α. 5-monotonicity is equivalent
13
0α α α
β β β β β β
1
Figure 3: Hasse diagram of (C(3)⊥,⊑)
to 1 ≥ 5β − 4α, while 6-monotonicity is equivalent to 1 ≥ 6β − 9α. 7-monotonicity does
not add further constraints.
From Example 1, nonnegativity of the Mo¨bius transform implies α ≥ 0 (atoms),
β ≥ 2α (2nd level), and m(⊤) = 6α− 6β + 1 ≥ 0. Then taking α = 0.1, β = 0.28 make
that f is a belief function, but m(⊤) = −0.08.
The last point concerns minitive functions. A minitive function on a lattice L is a
real-valued function f on L such that f(⊥) = 0, f(⊤) = 1, and
f(x ∧ y) = min(f(x), f(y)).
Hence a minitive function is a capacity. The following proposition by Barthe´lemy shows
that minitive functions always exist on C(n)⊥.
Proposition 10. Let L be a lattice and f : L→ R such that f(⊥) = 0, f(⊤) = 1. Then
f is a minitive function if and only if it is an invertible belief function whose Mo¨bius
transform is nonzero on a chain of C(n)⊥.
In other words, taking any chain C in C(n) and assigning nonnegative numbers on
elements of C such that their sum is 1 generates (by Proposition 9) a belief function
which is a minitive function.
7 Concluding remarks
The paper has given a natural structure to embedded subsets, and hence a better under-
standing to games in partition function form. Specifically, the main results from a game
theoretic viewpoint are:
• The set of embedded subsets forms a lattice, whose structure is much more compli-
cated and less easy to handle than the Boolean lattice of coalitions in the classical
setting. In particular, since the lattice is not distributive, no simple decomposition
of elements is possible, a fortiori no decompositions in atoms.
• The number of maximal chains between any two elements is known. This allows
the definition of many notions in game theory, like the Shapley value.
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• The decomposition of games into the basis of unanimity games, and hence its
Harsanyi dividends, is known.
• There is no additivity property for such games, hence there is few hope to express
them in a simpler form.
• Infinite monotonicity is no more equivalent to the nonnegativity of the Mo¨bius
transform (Harsanyi dividends).
We hope that this work can help in the clarification and further investigation on games
in partition function form.
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